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JURISPRUDENCE: LANDSCAPE, THRESHOLDS 
AND HORIZONS 
Anne Schillmoller* and Alessandro Pelizzon* 
ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates central ideas in the emergent field of Earth 
Jurisprudence. It suggests that development of conceptual and practical 
frameworks for an earth justice system predicated on rights of nature is 
currently at a nascent stage, but such ‘creative uncertainty’ provides 
scholars and practitioners with opportunities to identify and articulate 
new conceptual frameworks which avoid some of the hazards of human 
exceptionalism.  
Part I suggests that the concept of ‘rights of nature’ rests upon 
contestable epistemological and ontological claims and that an effective 
Earth Jurisprudence will require a continual negotiation of 
interpretative disagreements and frameworks for action.  
Part II explores the ‘promiscuous concept’ of nature and argues 
that the ways in which biophysical reality is articulated and represented 
in some Earth Jurisprudence scholarship requires further investigation. 
With reference to the concept of ‘rights’, parts III and IV 
investigate the relationship between the idea of a non-anthropocentric 
earth justice system and the pragmatic imperatives of human juridical 
systems. It suggests that the incommensurability between a theory of 
earth justice and practice of an earth justice system will continue to 
involve exponents of Earth Jurisprudence in a host of scientific, legal, 
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political and ethical tensions, ones demanding an ongoing negotiation 
of conceptual frameworks together with a pragmatic willingness to 
concede to the normative anthropocentrism of juridical frameworks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
‘The hunt for any natural resting point is as unrealistic as to reach 
out for the horizon.’ 1 
Earth jurisprudence is an emerging area of law in which the 
integrity and health of ecosystems become a central concern of human 
legal and political institutions. In recent years, several countries have 
proposed constitutional reforms which mandate legal recognition of 
ecosystems’  ‘right to exist’. In September 2008 Ecuador became the 
first country in the world to declare constitutional ‘rights of nature’ and 
to codify a new system of environmental governance.2 The new laws 
grant citizens the right to sue on behalf of an ecosystem, even if not 
injured themselves.3 
At this stage in its development, both the practice and theory of this 
emergent jurisprudence occupy indeterminate terrain, but one already 
inscribed by humanist precepts of what ‘rights’ and ‘nature’ might 
consist of.  Mindful that nature and rights are contested concepts with 
negotiable meanings; this paper identifies and investigates central 
epistemological and ontological thresholds with a view to contributing 
to the development of conceptual terrain for earth jurisprudence which 
avoid the hazards of human exceptionalism. 
This exploration is informed by emergent scholarship in the fields 
of ecological realism, speculative realism and object oriented ontology.  
What these movements offer are conceptual frameworks which seek to 
uphold the autonomy of reality against the depredations of 
anthropocentrism, ones within which humans have no particularly 
privileged place4. 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Arne Naess, Reflections about Total Views, 51(1) PHILOSOPHY AND 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 16, 25 (1964). 
 
 2. KENNETH J MIJESKI & SCOTT H BECK, PACHAKUTIK AND THE RISE AND 
DECLINE OF THE ECUADORIAN INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT 114-115 (2011). 
 
 3. Clare Kendall, A new law of nature, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 24, 2008l, available 
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/sep/24/equador.conservation.  As one 
of the architects of this new legal framework observed, Ecuador has taken a step into 
the ‘legal unknown’ and ‘a lot of people will be watching what happens’. 
 
 4. LEVI BRYANT, THE DEMOCRACY OF OBJECTS 40 (2011). 
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While recognizing a tension between the pragmatic imperatives of 
normative systems of human governance and the conceptual terrain of 
metaphysical realism, this paper enters a ‘realm of creative uncertainty’ 
with a view to the identification of possibilities for dialogue between 
emergent speculative fields, one which may inform the development of 
a hybrid philosophical and juridical framework capable of responding to 
urgent ecological crises. 
I. LANDSCAPE: AN ECOLOGY OF IDEAS 
‘We gain knowledge but only to lose the world.’ 5 
Mike Bell observes that the search for an earth jurisprudence is 
‘much like setting out on a journey in unfamiliar territory without an 
adequate map’.6 It is a journey which requires an interrogation of our 
reasons for embarking upon it, an articulation of the conceptual 
frameworks which inform it, and an identification of what is hoped will 
be achieved. Unavoidably, perhaps, the journey is one tainted by 
anthropocentrism and inscribed by deeply embedded notions of human 
exceptionalism. Whether it is one which may circumvent contamination 
by humanist frames of reference will, in all likelihood, remain an area of 
contention. 
Thomas Berry first proposed earth jurisprudence as an emerging 
framework for law in 2001.7 As a legal philosophy, earth jurisprudence 
is predicated upon the idea that humans are part of an interrelated 
community of beings and that the welfare of each member of this 
community is directly connected to, and dependent upon, the welfare of 
the earth community as a whole.8 Some proponents of earth 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Cary Wolfe, Introduction to STANLEY CAVELL, CORA DIAMOND, JOHN 
MCDOWELL, IAN HACKING & CARY WOLFE, PHILOSOPHY AND ANIMAL LIFE, at 5 
(2008). 
 
 6. Mike Bell, Thomas Berry and an Earth Jurisprudence: An Exploratory Essay, 
19(1) THE TRUMPETER 69 (2003). 
 
 7. Id. 
 
 8. CORMAC CULLINAN, A History of Wild Law, in EXPLORING WILD LAW: THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF EARTH JURISPRUDENCE (Peter Burdon ed., 2011). Because, it is 
reasonably safe to assume, the universe is not terra nullius, the notion of ‘earth 
community’, is itself problematic. It may be that limiting earth jurisprudence to 
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jurisprudence advocate the recognition of ‘rights of nature’, a system of 
governance which extends the protection of laws beyond humans to the 
entire ‘earth community’.9 These authors assert that such laws may 
function as regulatory systems in a way that is consistent with 
‘fundamental laws’, or the ‘Great Jurisprudence’.10 
During the last decade there have been a number of legislative 
initiatives which enshrine rights for nature in domestic legal systems. In 
2008 Ecuador was the first country to introduce constitutional 
recognition of rights for nature.11 On 30 March 2011, the first successful 
legal challenge recognizing such rights under Article 71 of the 
Ecuadorian Constitution was heard in the Provincial Justice Court of 
Loja.12 In the case, the Court issued a constitutional injunction against 
the Provincial Government of Loja in favor of the Vilcabamba River. It 
held that a project to widen the Vilcabamba-Quinara road, which had 
                                                                                                                 
‘planetary’ thinking is another form of anthropocentrism in which humans are 
privileging their specific ecology.  The notion that we are all members of a complex 
and diverse community of life on Earth and that we (humans) have ethical obligations 
to defend and strengthen the integrity of the Earth community for the sake of its current 
and future members, might arguably exclude the indivisible inclusion of this 
community in a complex and diverse cosmos. An inclusive ecocentric sensibility would 
suggest that ecological perspectives encompass the much larger cosmological context 
of life, including physical ‘laws’, which have developed in response to a complex series 
of extra planetary conditions. The writers wish to acknowledge the contributions of 
their colleague, Aidan Ricketts, for his succinct articulation of these ideas. See also 
QUENTIN MEILLASSOUX, AFTER FINITUDE: AN ESSAY ON THE NECESSITY OF 
CONTINGENCY (2008), (suggesting that ‘the cosmos compels us to face the contingency 
of thought and to rethink the priority of human access.’), EDGAR MORIN, INTRODUCTION 
TO A HUMAN POLITICS (1999), (arguing that ‘all entities in the universe are enfolded 
within the ecology of the cosmos.’ 
 
 9. CULLINAN, supra note 8. 
 
 10. See THOMAS BERRY, THE GREAT WORK: OUR WAY INTO THE FUTURE (1999). 
 
 11. MIJESKI & BECK, supra note 2. 
 
 12. Ecuador’s Constitutional Rights for Nature provides that ‘Nature has the right 
to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions and its 
processes’ and ‘a right to an integral restoration’. Importantly, it identifies juridical 
mechanisms for the recognition, regulation and enforcement of these rights.  See The 
Panchamama Alliance, First Successful Case Enforcing Rights of Nature in Ecuador, 
July 29, 2011, available at http://www.pachamama.org/news/first-successful-case-
enforcing-rights-of-nature-in-ecuador (last visited May 25, 2013). 
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been underway for three years without studies on its environmental 
impact, directly violated the rights of nature by increasing the river flow, 
provoking a risk of disaster from floods and adversely affecting the 
riverside populations that utilize the river’s resources. The Court 
declared that the defendant had ‘violated the right that nature has to be 
fully respected in its existence and maintenance of its vital cycles, 
structure, functions, and evolutionary processes’.13 
In the United States, local ordinances have been passed that 
partially recognize rights of nature within local communities,14 and 
Bolivia is currently set to legislate the ‘Law of Mother Earth’ which 
identifies eleven specific rights for nature.15  In 2010 Bolivian President 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Provincial Court of Justice of Loja, sentence No. 11121-2011-0010, March 30, 
2011. The Constitutional Injunction established: 
 The suitability and efficacy of the Constitutional injunction as the only way to 
remedy in an immediate manner the environmental damage focusing on the 
undeniable, elemental, and essential importance of nature, and taking into 
account the evident process of degradation; 
 That, based on the precautionary principle, until it is objectively demonstrated 
that the probability of certain danger that a project undertaken in an 
established area does not produce contamination or lead to environmental 
damage, it is the responsibility of the constitutional judges to incline towards 
the immediate protection and the legal tutelage of the rights of nature, doing 
what is necessary to prevent contamination or call for remedy; 
 The recognition that damages to nature are generational damages, defined as 
such for their magnitude that impact not only the present generation but also 
future ones; 
 That the plaintiffs should not have to prove the existence of damages but that 
the Provincial Government of Loja, as the entity that administers the activity, 
had to have provide certain evidence that the widening the road would not 
affect the environment; 
 That the defendant’s argument that the population needs roads does not apply 
since there is no sacrifice of constitutional rights because the case did not 
question the widening of the road, but the respect for the constitutional rights 
of nature. http://therightsofnature.org/first-ron-case-ecuador 
 
 14. See generally Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund, Ordinance 
Archive, September 24, 2011, available at http://celdf.org/ordinance-
archive?preview=1&cache=0 (last visited May 25, 2013). 
 
 15. These rights include: the right to life and to exist; the right to continue vital 
cycles and processes free from human alteration; the right to pure water and clean air; 
the right to balance; the right not to be polluted; and the right to not have cellular 
structure modified or genetically altered. It will also enshrine the right of nature ‘to not 
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Evo Morales convened a World Conference of Peoples on Climate 
Change and Mother Earth’s Rights in Cochabamba. A significant 
outcome of that conference was the drafting of a Universal Declaration 
on the Rights of Mother Earth, a document which ‘demands a paradigm 
shift and a conscious effort on the part of man [sic] to own up to our 
errors and settles on amending our patterns of production and 
consumption.’16 This Declaration was presented by Ecuadorian 
ambassador Pablo Solon to the United Nations Climate Change 
Conference in June 2011. 
Mindful of these initiatives, the development of conceptual and 
practical frameworks for an earth justice system predicated on rights of 
nature remains at a nascent stage. The emergent discourse and practice 
of earth jurisprudence will require decisions to be made relating to the 
ways in which biophysical reality (including ‘nature’), and juridical 
concepts (including ‘rights’) are articulated and represented. But 
because the content of such epistemological and ontological claims rest 
on contestable assumptions, it is to be supposed that the determination 
of these frameworks will be the subject of continuing negotiation among 
both scholars and practitioners of emergent earth governance systems. 
As a transdisciplinary endeavor, the development of frameworks 
for earth jurisprudence will be informed by a range of disciplinary 
paradigms including those of law, philosophy and the social, natural and 
biological sciences. But because each discipline employs different 
historically and culturally specific methods of knowledge production, 
any attempt to arrive at a coherent and unified framework for Earth 
jurisprudence would risk misrepresenting the richness and complexity of 
its conceptual terrain.17 Consequently, recognition that knowledge 
                                                                                                                 
be affected by mega-infrastructure and development projects that affect the balance of 
ecosystems and the local inhabitant communities’. See John Vidal, Law of Mother 
Earth expected to prompt radical new conservation and social measures in South 




 16. Nnimmo Bassey, Vision: The Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth is our 
roadmap to a livable future, in THE RIGHTS OF NATURE, THE CASE FOR A UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF MOTHER EARTH (Council of Canadians, Global 
Exchange & Fundacion Pachamama eds., 2011). 
 
 17. Edgar Morin suggests that human beings are open to possession by their own 
ideologies and systems of belief. As a result, he argues, knowledge production is 
variable across paradigmatic divides which renders problematic the idea of positive or 
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production is variable across paradigmatic divides renders problematic 
the identification of a stable and non negotiable landscape for an earth 
justice system. 
Edgar Morin recognizes that thinking of knowledge as the product 
of disciplinary paradigms necessarily gives rise to a ‘realm of creative 
uncertainty’.18 Because human beings are open to possession by their 
ideologies and systems of belief, the ‘ecology of ideas’, Morin asserts, 
has a significant impact on the lived perceptions and practices of homo 
sapiens and on everything that may be affected by them. For this reason, 
it is not just knowledge that is of central importance in the solving of 
problems, but rather a ‘knowledge of knowledge.’ 19 It may be supposed 
that the identification and articulation of this ‘knowledge of knowledge’, 
will engender areas of disagreement among scholars, practitioners and 
activists and will be the subject of continuing negotiation for the 
development of the theory and practice of earth jurisprudence. 
Nearly half a century ago, Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss 
observed that the conceptual frameworks informing ecological thinking 
consisted of a ‘wide variety of fundamentally different and even 
incompatible philosophies.’20 Næss neither proposed nor advocated a 
single ecophilosophy but emphasized that his version represented only 
one account. His extensive corpus of work on ‘ecosophy’ reflects a 
range of views concerning the meaning of nature and of ‘reality’. In it, 
what began as a metaphysical account of a single form of reality or 
‘unified science’ was gradually replaced with a pluralistic approach 
which recognized the possibility of a number of competing and 
scientific theories, any of which, Næss observed, could be said to be 
compatible with ‘reality’.21 
                                                                                                                 
stable knowledge. EDGAR MORIN, JOURNAL DE PLOZEVET (2001). For a detailed 
investigation of the concept of knowledge production and disciplinary paradigms, see 
e.g.  MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS (1970); THOMAS KUHN, THE 
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3rd ed. 1996). 
 
 18. MORIN, supra note 8. 
 
 19. Id. 
 
 20. NAESS, supra note 1. 
 
 21. ARNE NAESS, THE PLURALIST AND POSSIBILIST ASPECT OF THE SCIENTIFIC 
ENTERPRISE (1972). 
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While Næss acknowledged that contemplation of the ‘vast plurality 
of possible worlds’ can undermine the capacity to respond to serious 
problems that we encounter,22 Catriona Sandilands suggests that a 
‘strategy of healthy multiplicity’ for environmental politics can provide 
us with an opportunity to be actively engaged citizens whose role it is to 
help to ‘clarify, refine and develop the ‘truthfulness’ of various 
perspectives’. If we don’t know in advance of the conversation what 
environmental justice will look like, Sandilands argues, then we have to 
pay very close attention to how the world appears to the others with 
whom we share responsibility for its construction: 
‘Environmental justice politics invites the appearance of a variety 
of different claims to know nature and to know justice. Without a clear 
sense of what an ecological rationality might look like before processes 
of debate and politicization occur, environmental justice requires a 
‘necessary but critically interacting multiplicity of views on nature’.23 
The views articulated here suggest that a recognition of the 
contingency of meaning will oblige scholars and practitioners of earth 
jurisprudence to continually negotiate interpretative disagreements and 
frameworks for action. They also suggest that the tension between 
skepticism about knowledge and the pragmatic imperatives of effective 
strategic interventions provide opportunities for the development of 
inclusive dialogues which ‘avoid the manifold dangers to democratic 
societies of totalizing moral schemes’.24 
In the discussion which follows, this paper identifies a number of 
threshold epistemological and ontological claims which, it is suggested, 
will require investigation and negotiation with a view to the 
identification of frameworks to inform the theoretical terrain of, and 
pragmatic strategies for, an effective earth justice system. 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Arne Næss, The Shallow and the Deep, Long Range Ecology Movement: A 
Summary, 16 INQUIRY 95 (1973). 
 
 23. Catriona Sandilands, Opinionated Natures: Toward a Green Public Culture, in 
DEMOCRACY AND THE CLAIMS OF NATURE: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FOR A NEW 
CENTURY 149-150 (Ben A. Minter & Bob Pepperman Taylor eds., 2002). 
 
 24. Cary Wolfe, Old Orders for New: Ecology Animal Rights, and The Poverty of 
Humanism, in AMERICAN CULTURE, THE DISCOURSE OF SPECIES AND POSTHUMANIST 
THEORY, 22 (2003). 
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II. THRESHOLD: THE MEANING OF NATURE AND ‘NATURE’S MEANING’ 
‘To philosophize about nature is to produce it.’ 25 
Kate Soper observes that nature is a ‘promiscuous concept’. 26 And 
as Michael Carolan notes, the term ‘nature’ is used to speak of any 
number of things: from the ‘not natural,’ such as the urban landscape; to 
the nature of unspoiled wilderness; to the forces of nature, such as 
gravity and natural selection; to the nature of the universe, of dark 
matter and galaxies; and finally, to human nature. Is there any hope, 
Carolan asks, of ‘unsnarling this terminological quagmire’, or will we be 
forced to abandon the concept in its quest for conceptual and analytic 
specificity? 27 
Structural anthropologists have suggested that the binary of nature 
and culture is one by which human societies organize their conceptual 
world28 and poststructuralist thinkers have demonstrated that the 
meaning of this dualism is a shifting one which is ‘co-implicated with 
power, desire, and other such forces’.29 Whether represented as an 
artifact of human consciousness (nomos) or the result of biophysical 
                                                                                                                 
 25. FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH VON SCHELLING, IDEAS FOR A PHILOSOPHY OF 
NATURE (IV, 3) (EE Harris & P Health [trans], Cambridge Univ Press,1988) (1797). 
 
 26. KATE SOPER, WHAT IS NATURE? 15-20 (1995). Soper argues that nature exists 
in both a realist sense, thereby   making room for very real biophysical limits, and in a 
sociocultural sense, so as to provide conceptual space for social critique and the ever-
important analysis of power. She identifies three ‘kinds’ of nature: external nature (the 
assumption that nature is external to, and different from, society); intrinsic nature 
(nature as ‘an inherent and essential quality’ of something) and universal nature (nature 
as a global ecological system). 
 
 27. Michael Carolan, Society, Biology, and Ecology: Bringing Nature Back Into 
Sociology’s Disciplinary Narrative Through Critical Realism, 18 ORGANIZATION & 
ENVIRONMENT 393 (2005). 
 
 28. CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP (Rodney 
Needham [trans], Beacon Press, 1969) (1949). 
 
 29. Adrian Ivakhiv, Social Nature: Collapsing Dichotomies Without Unraveling 
The Fabric Of Things (August 18, 2011), http://www.archivefire.net/2011/05/ivakhiv-
on-nature-and-collapsing.html. 
 
2013] MAPPING THE TERRAIN OF EARTH JURISPRUDENCE 11 
processes (physis), what nature ‘is’ and what nature ‘means’ are likely to 
remain contested areas.30 
The consequences of such contestation for an earth justice system 
predicated on rights for nature  is  a problematic tension between the 
requirement of a concept of nature upon which to ground action, and an 
awareness of the impossibility of settling upon a definitive version of 
what nature ‘is’.31 As a result, those concerned to develop an earth 
jurisprudence may be obliged to base their praxis on accounts of nature 
which they know to be contestable and contingent. They may be assisted 
however, by the work of contemporary political ecologists who are 
concerned not only to interrogate the interdependence of human and 
nonhuman realms, but also to question the assumptions which support 
the division of the natural from the cultural. The aim of political ecology 
is not to protect ‘nature’ but to problematize the social and scientific 
processes that constitute our understanding of the world. By bringing 
questions of nature and culture into the processes of politics, political 
ecology gestures towards new possibilities for political theory which 
move beyond a paralyzing denial of nature and which involve the 
nonhuman world as actors in democratic political processes. 
Peter Knudtson and David Suzuki have suggested that ‘ecosystems 
are human constructs to which nature is blind’.32  While Bruno Latour 
agrees that ideas of nature are historically situated constructions of 
human consciousness, he offers what he claims is a non anthropocentric 
account of nature in which ‘reality’ emerges independently of human 
interpretation.  We should not, he contends, aim to marry culture and 
nature, but to dissolve the distinction all together.33 Latour posits a 
world of highly complex relations between humans and ‘non-humans’ 
(things, animals), in which the latter are granted the same ‘amount’ of 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Κ W Junker, Reading Nature Through Culture in Plato and Aristotle’s works 
on Law, 7(1) PHRONIMON 61, 63 (1999). Junker argues that the binary trap of physis 
and nomos lies in believing that an understanding of nature can be achieved by creating 
a hierarchy of derivation. Once we allow our understanding of nature to be framed by 
this hierarchy, Junker says, scientific empiricism almost inevitably leads to the 
contestable conclusion that nature is primary and culture is derivative. 
 
 31. See also CORMAC CULLINAN, WILD LAW: A MANIFESTO FOR EARTH JUSTICE 
(2003). 
 
 32. PETER KNUDTSON & DAVID SUZUKI, WISDOM OF THE ELDERS 44 (1992). 
 
 33. BRUNO LATOUR, POLITICS OF NATURE (Catherine Porter [trans], 2004). 
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agency as humans, resulting in a symmetrical, non-hierarchical 
structure. His political ecology is one in which animate and inanimate 
entities are ‘actants’ in networks or ‘assemblages’. Because all entities 
have equal ontological status, modes of classification predicated upon a 
subject/object dualism are avoided.34 
In his rejection of the basic distinction between nature and culture, 
Latour claims that the development of modern (western) society has 
rested on ‘a collective self-delusion’ and that the processes of setting the 
natural world against culture as either a chaotic force that needs to be 
controlled or as a ‘mother nature’ in balance, is unique to the western 
philosophical tradition.35  Within this tradition, nature is regarded as 
outside the realm of politics which is seen as an exclusively human 
affair. Latour contends, however, that nature is not a particular sphere of 
reality but the result of a political division. In a world where nature has 
become one of widespread political concern, a view of politics as an 
exclusively human affair, he argues, ‘leaves nature to the scientists’. 
Although we should subject science’s claims of a faithful representation 
of nature to the same criticism as that leveled at our political 
representatives, Latour claims the scientist to be a ‘highly useful 
representative’ of the nonhuman realm. 36 
While he acknowledges that the politics of nature is ‘a rather 
troublesome one,’ Latour claims that a ‘parliament of things’ offers 
possibilities for a non-anthropocentric participatory democracy in which 
nonhuman voices are taken into account.  Arguing that representative 
democracy requires representation for non-humans as well as humans, 
Latour advocates a ‘global parliament’ for non-humans as well as for 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id.; See also MANUEL DE LANDA, A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIETY: 
ASSEMBLAGE THEORY AND SOCIAL COMPLEXITY (2006); De Landa also proposes an 
approach to social ontology which asserts the autonomous nature of social entities, but 
one which takes Gilles Deleuze’s theory of assemblages as its main framework. 
 
 35. BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN 10-11 (Catherine Porter 
[trans], 1993). (Identifying two demarcations that he sees as crucial to the formation of 
modernity: the first demarcation is between the domain of nature and the domain of 
culture, and the second between the processes of purification and the processes of 
translation. The work of purification refers to the attempt to separate nature and culture 
into ‘two entirely distinct ontological zones: that of humans on the one hand; that of 
nonhumans on the other’.) 
 
 36. Id. 
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humans, each ‘representing their constituencies’ and no one being able 
to claim to represent the general will.’37 
While Latour acknowledges that the process of representing 
nonhumans is not simple, for him it is little different from the process of 
representing humans. In Latourian democratic politics scientific 
spokespersons play an important role because it is through them that non 
human entities acquire a ‘voice’. The divide, he says, is not between 
science and politics but between ‘trusted and not trusted 
representatives’.38 
While the efficacy of Latour’s parliament of things requires 
confidence in ‘trusted’ representatives, his model pays scant regard to 
asymmetries of power between spokespersons and nonhuman entities 
and the difficulties of recovering the voices and determining the 
interests of these entities. While Foucault did not extend his concept of 
biopolitical power to non human entities, it is suggested that discourses 
of human exceptionalism remain integral to processes of biopolitical 
normalization.39 So while Latour’s work is motivated by a democratic 
impulse to include a multiplicity of voices, if it hopes to offer a proper 
democratic politics, it will have to find ways to deal with hierarchies of 
interest and differentials of power.40 
Because it will be humans who represent and/or ‘speak’ for non 
human entities in an earth justice system, these are also significant 
issues for earth jurisprudence.  How and by whom will non human 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: East and West Perspectives, 4(1) ETHICS & 
GLOBAL POLITICS 71 (2011). 
 
 38. Id. at 144. 
 
 39. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOL 1: THE WILL TO 
KNOWLEDGE (1998). Biopolitics for Foucault is political power exercised on whole 
populations in every aspect of human life. Through power saturated discourses and 
knowledge, the exercise of biopower produces and makes possible permissible modes 
of being and thinking while disqualifying and/or making others impossible. 
 
 40. See Srikanth Mallavarapu and Amit Prasad, Facts, Fetishes, and the 
Parliament of Things: Is There any Space for Critique?, (20)2 SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY 
185, 193 (2006). See also Donna Haraway, MODEST WITNESS@SECOND_MILLENIUM. 
FEMALEMAN MEETS ONCOMOUSE: FEMINISM AND TECHNOSCIENCE 280 (1997), 
(suggesting that it is ‘less epistemologically, politically, and emotionally powerful to 
see that there are …hybrids of the human and non-human … than to ask for whom and 
how these hybrids work.’) 
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voices be represented and by what processes will the interests of 
nonhuman entities be determined? These are normative concerns that an 
earth justice system predicated on rights for nature will be compelled to 
negotiate. 
Adam Robbert agrees that the idea of nature can get us into some 
‘grave conceptual cul-de-sacs’ and seeks to reframe the conversation by 
‘sliding the idea of nature out of the vice-grip of nature-culture dualism.’ 
While it is arguable that his model of ecological domains is, like 
Latour’s, one which remains trapped in a realm of ideas, it offers a non 
humanist and multiplicitous account of nature which avoids the 
polarization of biocentrism and anthropocentrism. Robbert identifies 
three ontologically concrete ecological domains: natural ecology, media 
ecology and knowledge ecology. These domains are not bounded 
systems but co-emergent ‘ecologies of objects’ which he claims are 
capable of accounting for the ontological and epistemological 
circumstances of all organisms: 
‘Different organisms, cultures, or species literally enact, abstract, 
and construct, distinct ontological domains which have ongoing 
recursive effects.’41 
Because nonhumans contain and participate in each of these 
ecologies, Robbert’s model both avoids biocentric notions of organism 
and environment and provides a non anthropocentric ‘principle of 
relationships’ not situated relative to human experience.42 
Edgar Morin agrees that there is no a stable boundary between 
‘humans’ and ‘nature.’ Attentive to how the meaning of being human is 
tied up with our constructions of nature, he contends that what nature 
‘is’, shifts in relation to epistemological, social and political-ethical 
changes. Nature, for Morin, is ‘inextricably confounded with humanity’s 
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projects and self-understandings.’43 He embraces an ecological approach 
to understand not only environmental systems but also systems of 
knowledge, identity and perception. Human perception, Morin claims, is 
in a dynamic, ecological relationship to ideas and paradigms that re-
frame perception itself in an ongoing evolutionary process: 
‘What we need is an ecologized thinking that considers the vital 
link of every living, human, or social system to its environment’. 44 
Morin describes his approach as a ‘fundamental anthropology’, one 
which incorporates elements of biology, psychology, anthropology, 
ecology and systems theory into a ‘non-centered systems approach’. 
This anthropology asserts the inadequacy of both pan-biologisms and 
pan-culturalisms, in favor of more complex representations of truth that 
are neither biological nor cultural, but which reveal nature as a multiple 
objective reality disclosed by multiple empirical sciences.45 To this 
extent, unlike Latour, Morin’s anthropological approach is perhaps 
better equipped to embrace an ontological pluralism capable of 
acknowledging cultural specificities associated with the concept of 
nature.46 
Morin contends that every entity in the universe, (be it a thought, a 
mythos, a political movement or a thermodynamic energy gradient) are 
enfolded within the ecology of the cosmos. This complex movement of 
nature, culture, and thought, for Morin, is leading towards what he calls 
the ‘Planetary Era,’ one which reveals relational and multidimensional 
processes of influence that link the Earth into a planetary whole.47 
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Morin’s aim is not to reduce the concreteness of ‘reality’ to a single 
paradigm, but to reveal the mutually implicative character of perception 
and world that constitutes the ecology of experience: 
‘[I] think we construct our perception of the world, but with the 
help of the world itself which, as it were, ‘lends us a hand’. What we 
know is not the world itself, but the world along with our knowledge of 
it. We cannot isolate the world from our structures of knowing. Mind 
and world are inseparable.’ 48 
Alf Hornborg’s relational epistemology also recognizes that human 
cognition is a mutually constellating act that ‘designates simultaneously 
the knower as a subject and the known as an object of knowledge’. 
Hornborg’s analysis of power suggests that it is important to avoid 
naturalizing ecological processes that background political and 
economic practices of marginalization in the name of science. To this 
extent, he identifies a tension between the view that an objective 
biophysical environment exists and one which insists upon constructed 
discourses of history and culture: 
‘All ecosystems carry the imprints of human activity. In other 
words, human social phenomena such as culture, language, and power 
are really components of ecosystems.’49 
Hornborg argues, however, that notions of nature as culturally 
constructed projections of a historically embedded society are not 
sufficient to understand contemporary ecological problems, nor are they 
accurately descriptive of ontological spaces designated as ‘nature.’ He 
contends that essentialist views that depict nature as existing ‘out there’ 
in a ‘pure’ state separate from human activity, also point to an 
insufficient understanding of ecological processes: 
‘If natural landscapes virtually everywhere carry traces of human 
activity, then the conclusion must be that ‘nature’ is imbued with human 
culture and that language intervenes in ecological processes.’ 50 
Hornborg’s view is suggestive of a number of contemporary 
frameworks which suggest that traditional conceptions of nature are 
inimical to ecological thinking and which advocate an ‘end’ to nature. 
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For example, scholars in the emergent field of speculative realism 
have advocated the development of an ecologically inspired ‘object-
oriented’ philosophy that seeks to describe the nature of all relations as 
ecological. As a new form of metaphysics which takes place in what 
Gironi has called a ‘scientifico-philosophical hybrid field’,51 speculative 
realism has developed as a response both to the epistemological prestige 
and popular appeal of the natural sciences and to the failure of 
continental philosophy to comprehensively respond to this science. With 
reference to  Quentin Meillassoux’s  After Finititude, Gironi argues that 
the last forty years of the physical sciences has powerfully presented to 
humankind the disconcerting vastness of the ‘great outdoors’ and that in 
their response to these developments, the speculative realists represent 
‘a return to the true meaning of the Copernican Revolution’. Speculative 
realism he says is not a doctrine, but an umbrella term for a variety of 
programs which protest the rigid ideological categories of culture/nature 
and are ‘committed to upholding the autonomy of reality against the 
depredations of anthropocentrism’.52 Meillassoux’s speculative 
metaphysics asserts that the sense of desolation and abandonment which 
modern science instills in humanity’s conception of itself and of the 
cosmos compels us to face the contingency of thought and to rethink the 
priority of human access: 
‘[I]t could be that contemporary philosophers have lost the great 
outdoors, the absolute outside of pre-critical thinkers: that outside 
which was not relative to us, and which was given as indifferent to 
its own givenness to be what it is, existing in itself regardless of 
whether we are thinking of it or not; that outside which thought 
could explore with the legitimate feeling of being on foreign 
territory—of being entirely elsewhere.’53 
Levi Bryant’s response to this sense of bereavement is the notion of 
a ’wilderness ontology’, a cosmos within which humans are not 
sovereigns of being and have no particularly privileged place.  Within 
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such a wilderness there is no distinction between the natural and the 
cultural, the human and the natural, but only a flat field in which 
humans are simply ‘beings amongst beings’. Bryant’s wilderness 
ontology is not conceived in terms of the absence of humans, but rather 
in terms of a flat ontology in which humans are among beings without 
enjoying any unilateral, sovereign role: 
‘The most insignificant quark on the other side of the universe 
makes its difference(s) without any relation to our consciousness or 
knowledge of that quark. Difference is thus a matter of the ‘things 
themselves’, not our relationship to things. In this regard, the Principle 
of the Inhuman is formulated not so as to exclude the human—humans 
and human artifacts, after all, make differences too—but rather to 
underline the point that humans are beings among the swarm of 
differences and hold no special or privileged place with respect to these 
differences’.54 
To this extent, Bryant’s speculative approach stands in stark 
contrast with Neill Evernden’s suggestion that ‘through our conceptual 
domestication of nature, we extinguish wild otherness even in the 
imagination.’55 Bryant argues that Enlightenment thought was premised 
on an ‘infantile and narcissistic fantasy’ of the world as a screen for 
human intentions; one which enabled us to enjoy an imagined dominion 
over the forces of nature itself. This ‘continuing immaturity’, he states, 
fails to recognize the manner in which humankind is heteronomously 
determined. Humans, Bryant suggests, only ever act in assemblages that 
‘exceed our intentions and expectations’ and that unless we 
acknowledge our entanglements, we will be unable to attend to the 
‘strange strangers.’ 56 Together with Timothy Morton, Bryant uses the 
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 56. See also TIMOTHY MORTON, ECOLOGY WITHOUT NATURE: RETHINKING 
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notion of ‘dark ecology’, one focused on mystery and the impossibility 
of a human mind big enough to encompass the universe. Dark ecology is 
predicated upon an awareness that objects and entities are never fully 
present nor ever fully manifest themselves. What dark ecology 
investigates is not the entities themselves, nor the environment which 
contains them, but the shifting and changing relations among them.57  
Bryant suggests that a ‘dark’ ecological politics invites us to ‘hang out 
in the muck and muddiness of uncertainty’ and obliges us to constantly 
reframe our view of the ecological.58 
Timothy Morton’s agrees with Robbert that the major stumbling 
block to ecological thinking is the image of nature itself. While many 
ecological writers propose a new worldview, Morton suggests that their 
passion to preserve the natural world leads them away from the ‘nature’ 
they revere. We should, Morton argues, avoid romantic and holistic 
conceptions of nature which ‘avoid the challenge of radical 
coexistence.’ 59 He then articulates an apparent paradox: to have a 
properly ecological view, ‘we must relinquish the idea of nature once 
and for all.’ 60 
Morton suggests that the naïve empiricism of the positivist 
philosopher and the equally impoverished idea of the social construction 
of nature is, in the context of a twenty-first century ecological science, 
inadequate. Rather, Morton argues that nature, culture and biophysical 
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knowledge are collectively assembled elements of a complex and 
shifting mosaic of historical and ecological contingencies. His integral 
approach to ecology is one in which these elements are conceived in 
terms of ‘assemblages’ rather than as ‘systems’.  Intrinsically relative, 
they are mutually enacting and inseparable. Consequently, ‘nature’ can 
only ever be an abstract construction, ‘a horizon upon which cultural-
scientific modes of knowledge organize highly specific elements of a 
more complex reality’. 61 In Ecology without Nature, Morton introduces 
the idea of the ‘mesh’ as a way of understanding connections and 
separations among the objects of the world, while denying that there is 
some basic substance hovering in the background of all things. To think 
the ‘mesh’, Morton says, is to think connections and blank spaces; the 
latter the (no)thing that connects all things.62 
What these approaches to nature have in common is an 
acknowledgement that the idea of nature is inscribed by philosophical 
and paradigmatic assumptions and by political, economic and historical 
practices.  While the approaches of Latour, Morin, Hornborg and the 
speculative realists offer compelling theoretical challenges to the 
hegemony of anthropocentrism and ontological dualism, they are 
perhaps lacking in guidance as to how (and indeed whether) this 
hegemony might be avoided in practice. As Andrew Pickering observes: 
‘Philosophical critiques of dualism in its many guises are ten-a-
penny. We all know several versions. But they tend to remain toothless 
and trapped in the realm of ideas. Why might that be? It might be 
because non-dualist ideas find so little purchase in the made-world of 
our culture, the culture we have already assembled and find ourselves 
plunged into. We live in a world of objects and projects that continually 
echo back to us the truth of asymmetric dualism.’ 63 
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Pickering suggests that in the cultural assemblage we now inhabit, 
perhaps asymmetric dualism has become the ‘natural ontological 
attitude’, one which informs our grasp of the world we are living in and 
how we might imagine transforming it. 
So where does this discussion leave ‘nature’ other than as a 
confounded and problematic concept and what are the implications of 
these frameworks for an earth justice system predicated on rights for 
nature? For pragmatic and strategic purposes, will scholars and 
practitioners of earth jurisprudence be compelled to agree on a 
‘working’ definition of nature, while acknowledging its limitations? 
Certainly, the ‘promiscuous concept’ of nature requires a more 
comprehensive investigation. While its emergent discourse continues to 
problematize the human-nature dualism, earth jurisprudence has yet to 
comprehensively investigate the ontological and epistemological issues 
associated with the idea of nature. What can be said about earth 
jurisprudence is that it is informed by largely unproblematized notions 
of nature predicated on biological ‘systems’ characterized by 
interrelationships between constituent parts.64 
In proposing a closer relationship between nature and humankind, 
for example, Thomas Berry famously opined that ‘nature is a subject 
and not a collection of objects’.65 Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic identified 
a holistic natural community of which humans and other beings are a 
part. 66 Similarly, Arne Næss argued that human beings are constituent 
parts of one single natural system and are interdependent with the other 
components.67 More recently, James Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis 
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envisages the Earth as a single organism in which all parts are as 
interrelated and as interdependent as the cells of the human body.68 
Fritjof Capra proposes an integrating vision of the universe as a network 
of relations,69 while Peter Burdon remarks that ‘nature consists of 
networks, operating within networks’.70 Finally, the integral ecology 
movement is based on the idea that there is no single environment or 
macroecological unity to which multiple species and populations 
belong, but an interconnected multiplicity of eco-evolutionary 
processes.71 
Speculative realism may provide to earth jurisprudence some 
frameworks by which ideas of nature and natural systems may be more 
comprehensively investigated and articulated.  Although there is an 
apparent tension between an ‘ecology of objects’ and Thomas Berry’s 
‘communion of subjects’, both approaches envisage non-hierarchical 
relationships between entities. Perhaps the major points of difference are 
generational and semantic, the result of the ‘natural ontological attitude’ 
suggested by Pickering.  Whatever their differences, it might be 
supposed that Berry’s suggestion that ‘biosystems deserve the 
opportunity to be themselves and to express their own inner qualities’ is 
one which resonates with the ‘strange strangers’ of speculative realism. 
Commonalities can also be identified among speculative realism 
and views expressed by Alfred North Whitehead over seven decades 
ago. Whitehead argued that the abstractions of linguistic expression 
‘lead…away from the realities of the immediate world’, and regarded all 
questions concerning the ‘essence’ of nature as ‘speculative 
approximations’.72 Although he didn’t refer to it as such, his relational 
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perspective allowed for the emergence of a ‘flat ontology’ which the 
position of everything in nature is given only in terms of the relations it 
bears to other things.73 As Jeremy Dunham notes, Whitehead’s approach 
does not enable humans to stand condescendingly higher than nature, as 
in anthropocentric humanism, nor does it allow nature to be regarded as 
higher than human life, as in the biocentrism of radical anti-humanist 
ecologism. Dunham argues that Whitehead’s philosophy ‘remains the 
most convincing theory regarding the laws of nature’ and that while 
subsequent philosophical arguments may have become more 
sophisticated, the central arguments remain almost the same.74 
III. THRESHOLD: THE LAWS OF NATURE AND HUMAN GOVERNANCE 
‘To shift from …a lofty fancy as the planetarization of 
consciousness to the operation of our municipal legal system is to 
come down to earth hard.’75 
While there are some who suggest otherwise, it is argued here that 
the concept of rights is a juridical one and not a quality which inheres in 
nature. For this reason, it is suggested that a concept of rights for nature 
better reflects the normative quality of anthropocentric interventions 
than does a concept of rights of nature. Thomas Berry’s assertion that 
rights are ‘primordial’ and originate where existence originates, and that 
rights are structured by the nature of that existence, is one conceived in 
what Christopher Stone refers to as ‘socio-psychic’ terms as opposed to 
‘legal operational’ ones.76  To this extent, rights have both ontological 
and normative qualities. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
enter into a discussion of the positivism-natural law debate, it is argued 
that any suggestion that juridical concepts have their origin in nature 
should be approached with caution. This is because implicit in 
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primordial conceptions of rights is both a problematic conceptual 
separation of the ‘natural’ from the ‘not natural’ and a reiteration of a 
contestable natural law doctrine in which nature and its laws are 
regarded as a transcendent authority.77 As Whitehead opined, ‘there are 
no natural laws but only temporary habits of nature’. 78 And because the 
idea of nature itself is tainted by human exceptionalism, it follows that a 
concept of ‘natural’ rights is inherently problematic: 
‘Like a harlot, natural law is at the disposal of everyone. The 
ideology does not exist that cannot be defended by an appeal to the law 
of nature.’79 
Although he fails to clearly explain the relationship between a non 
anthropocentric earth justice system and a human justice system, Mike 
Bell asserts that ‘we cannot conceive of the rights of Earth through 
anthropocentric conceptions of human rights’ because ‘trying to use a 
human jurisprudence system to recognize and protect the rights of other 
species is a bit like sending the fox to guard the chickens’.80 He suggests 
that ‘because a human jurisprudence is a system of laws designed to 
recognize the pre-eminence of the human species, it is unlikely that a 
human jurisprudence can serve as a suitable framework for an earth 
jurisprudence’.81 With reference to Thomas Berry, Bell contends that an 
earth jurisprudence is not a human creation but ‘something that already 
exists in nature’: 
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‘And just as we do not create the laws of nature but, rather, seek to 
recognize them understand their implications, so it is with an earth 
jurisprudence.’82 
Bell’s suggestion causes us to wonder how we might ‘recognise 
and understand’ the implications of nature’s laws for the purposes of 
their incorporation in human juridical processes. And as cultural 
geographer, Daniel Demerrit argues, if nature simply ‘is’ then it 
becomes very difficult to talk about the power/knowledge relations 
enabled by the material and discursive preservation of nature’s essential 
reality.’83 
Some assistance may be derived from Christopher Stone’s 
pragmatic recognition of both the normative and ontological aspects of 
rights. As Stone notes, an entity cannot be said to hold a legal right 
unless and until some public authoritative body is prepared to provide 
some ‘amount’ of review to actions that are inconsistent with that right. 
84 
In addition to the question of whether an entity can be said to 
‘possess’ rights, any attempt to identify the juridical content of rights for 
nature will also raises a host of questions. 85 
Judith Koons asks: 
‘Should such rights extend to include all living beings or the entire 
Earth community (including rocks, rivers, and mountains). For 
example, what about weeds? Are gardeners morally prohibited from 
killing weeds? Is a mosquito the moral equal of a human being, 
triggering a no killing, positive-regard rule?...How should a line of 
sugar ants in the kitchen be treated? Since a swarm of termites 
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outnumber people in a building, should it be allowed to destroy the 
building? How is a river or a mountain to be counted, under a 
broader utilitarian assessment?’ 86 
Koons notes that in many accounts, nonliving natural objects are 
denied moral standing because they are considered to lack interests that 
are capable of being harmed or benefitted.  She argues, however, that 
even if an entity is held to lack ‘interests,’ that should not foreclose the 
entity from moral consideration. In this regards, she agrees with Berry 
that things in nature have interests ‘in being’.87 
The consensus definition of Earth Jurisprudence recently endorsed 
by the Centre for Earth Jurisprudence at Barry Law School, Florida 
recognizes both the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ implicit in an earth justice 
system: 
‘Earth Jurisprudence seeks Earth-centered approaches to law and 
governance.  As an integral part of the broader Earth community, 
humanity has responsibility to act for the well-being of the planet and 
future generations.  Earth Jurisprudence draws forth Earth-centered 
comprehensive solutions from within as well as beyond existing law.’88 
The tension between a theory of earth justice and the practice of an 
earth justice system will involve the exponents of earth jurisprudence in 
a host of scientific, legal, political and ethical challenges. It will require 
of its scholars and practitioners a negotiation of the official philosophy 
of ecologism and its burgeoning political practice.  Whether rights are 
conceptualized and represented in moral, ethico-political and/or juridical 
terms, transforming systems of environmental governance from ones in 
which nature is regarded as a resource for human exploitation, to one 
based on the recognition of natural ecosystems’ ‘primordial’ right to 
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exist and flourish, will demand radical paradigmatic shifts with 
significant implications for normative legal frameworks and processes. 
Although what these implications are have yet to be determined. 
Cormac Cullinan suggests that earth jurisprudence requires the ‘re-
alignment of human governance systems with the fundamental 
principles of how the universe functions’.89 In order to change 
completely the purpose of our governance systems, he argues, we must 
develop coherent new theories or philosophies of governance to 
supplant the old. Even if we were able to ascertain such ‘fundamental 
principles’, all human governance systems, and the theories which 
inform them, Cullinan asserts, will raise normative questions relating to 
their political and ethical legitimacy. 90 
Perhaps, as Christopher Stone observes: 
 
‘[A]t the level of praxis, an earth justice system will be 
unavoidably anthropocentric.91 
IV. THRESHOLD: (RE)PRESENTING EARTH 
While the legitimacy of democratic human centered governance 
depends upon appeals to the presence of members of different groups, 
they often do so without clear sources of authorization and 
accountability from those represented. The representation of nonhumans 
in deliberative institutions, John O’Neill observes, ‘is still more 
problematic’. In the necessary absence of their authorization, 
accountability, and presence, a claim to speak on behalf of non human 
nature ‘relies on epistemic claims, coupled with care’.92 
This paper has suggested that the culture-nature distinction is built 
on power relations, discursively constituted through ‘technologies of 
truth’ which function as a dividing practice. Because epistemic claims 
are inextricably linked with processes of power and of biopolitical 
normalization, any account of nature which purports to stand apart from 
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humanist history and its relations of knowledge and power becomes 
‘profoundly suspicious’. 93 
Consequently, it is incumbent upon those concerned to develop an 
earth centered system of governance to establish the epistemic 
conditions of knowledge, including what sorts of information is 
meaningful, who is recognized as speaking with accuracy and authority, 
and who decides these questions. If one accepts Foucault’s premise that 
the exercise of biopower produces and makes possible permissible 
modes of being and thinking while disqualifying and/or making others 
impossible, what  epistemic claims should properly inform an earth 
justice system and by what processes might such claims be determined? 
It has been suggested that any earth justice system needs to be 
cognizant of the asymmetrical power relations that persist in the world. 
As Donald Turner argues, calculations of interests and consequences 
may be inappropriate in the context of relationships which are 
‘structurally non-contractual, asymmetrical and rooted in ontological 
difference’.94  The discourse of earth jurisprudence needs to 
acknowledge that ‘human’ and ‘nature’ do not encounter one another in 
a symmetrical relationship, and that power and knowledge relations both 
produce and enable the material and discursive conditions of nature’s 
reality. It needs to acknowledge that both the biocentric language of 
science and the anthropocentric concerns of humanism can function to 
deflect consideration away from the processes of power by which nature 
is determined and represented. For these reasons, holistic representations 
of nature predicated upon reciprocity between human and non human 
biophysical communities should be approached with caution. 
Holistic notions of biological egalitarianism such as ‘mutually 
enhancing relations’, ‘reciprocity’ and ‘creative cooperation’ appear as 
central tenets in much earth jurisprudence discourse. For example, Linda 
Warren describes earth jurisprudence as ‘the philosophy of laws and 
regulations that gives formal recognition to the reciprocal relationship 
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between humans and the rest of nature’. 95 Thomas Berry suggested that 
an earth justice system is one that recognizes, honors and protects the 
rights of all species, ‘to exist and fulfill mutual self-supporting 
destinies.’96 Fritjof Capra’s notion of an ecological community is one of 
‘an assemblage of organisms, bound into a functional whole by their 
mutual relationships’.97 
While some holistic approaches to nature accept the conflict and 
violence of predator relationships and extreme atmospheric and 
geological events as elements of Earth’s ‘unity’, others are 
unproblematically grounded in notions of affinity.98 Holistic 
representations of nature include those that regard nature as a beneficent 
source of liberation and healing, and at their most extreme, as a utopian 
paradisiacal refuge. Susan Emmenegger and Axel Tschentscher suggest 
that in this form of holism, there is only one interested entity with one 
unitary interest. As a result, ‘situations of conflicting interests are 
impossible.’99 Jozef Keulartz has suggested that ‘people who see nature 
as a divine text will be more likely to adopt a passive rather than an 
active attitude towards nature.’ 100 And as Arne Næss acknowledged, 
biospherical egalitarianism can be affirmed only in principle since ‘any 
realistic praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation, and suppression.’ 
101 
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Nonholistic approaches to nature range from those which regard 
nature as a site of danger and a force for negation, destruction and 
threat, to those which regard nature as an uncontrollable chaotic force: 
‘Where has there ever been this Wisdom of Nature that regulates 
things … No doubt, at this very moment, there are planets with rich 
ecosystems being devoured by black holes. And indeed, there are 
galaxies colliding, destroying the delicate balance of solar systems 
where life is dependent on being a certain distance from their stars. 
There are even rogue planets that travel their aleatory journey 
throughout galaxies, destroying gravitational balances of solar systems 
that harbor life.’ 102 
The various perspectives outlined here demonstrate that that the 
ways in which nature is understood and represented are the subject of 
significant philosophical contestation.  They suggest that the notion of a 
‘mutually supporting’ Earth Community may be confounded by largely 
unarticulated premises. 
Frederick Ferre states that he finds it ‘impossibly grotesque’ to 
think of humanity as ‘just another species’. He argues that ‘perspectival 
anthropocentrism’ is inevitable and ‘perfectly licit’.103  Although 
humans are right to be anguished and outraged about what we have done 
to harm earth, Ferre argues ‘there is no point in feigning that we are not 
distinctly human’. Ferre contends that because perspectival 
anthropocentrism is unavoidable, it cannot be regarded as 
anthropocentric in ‘any objectionable’ way. Rather, he suggests, humans 
need to explore a relational ethic that is ‘healthily polycentric’: 
‘Many environmental thinkers are torn in two opposing directions 
at once. For good reasons we are appalled by the damage that has been 
done to the earth by the ethos of heedless anthropocentric 
individualism…But also for good reasons we are repelled, at the other 
extreme, by environmentally correct images of mindless biocentric 
collectivisms in which precious personal values are overridden for the 
good of some healthy beehive ‘whole’.’ 104 
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Whether or not one agrees with Ferre’s perspectival 
anthropocentrism, a threshold issue for an earth justice system is 
whether its effectiveness as a conceptual and juridical system requires 
an abandonment of arguably unavoidable anthropocentric frames of 
reference. Can an earth justice system be conceptualized and function as 
a form of ‘strategic’ or ‘normative’ anthropocentrism or does its efficacy 
depend upon, as Leopold  and other deep ecologists seem to suggest,  a 
‘subversive non-anthropocentric humanism’?  While we may imagine a 
sensibility which extends ethical responsibility from a humanistic centre 
to a multiplicity of ontologically marginalized others, do the pragmatic 
imperatives of normative juridical interventions compel us to ‘think the 
mountain’  like a human?105 
V. HORIZON: ASSEMBLAGES 
‘Understanding our ontological condition as a performative dance 
of agency with human and nonhuman others is precisely not to 
dwell on our specialness-it is to step outside the moralized space of 
human exceptionalism’.106 
This paper has identified a range of issues relating to ‘nature, 
‘rights’ and representation that exponents of an earth justice system 
predicated on rights for nature will be required to negotiate. It has 
identified the fraught relationship between human systems of 
governance and ‘natural’ entities, and has suggested that the ways in 
which humans see themselves in relation to nature will impact upon 
political and ecological practice.  It suggests that if nature can be 
comprehended only as an abstract construction upon which cultural, 
political and scientific modes of knowledge are inscribed, that the 
identification of the subject and content of juridical rights for nature will 
be a matter of contestation and negotiation. 
Kerry Whiteside observes that ‘nature has long served as one of 
political theory’s most significant Others’ but that the distinction 
between nature and politics is not as neat as most political theorists 
imagine.107  While the anthropocentrism intrinsic to the western 
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philosophical tradition continues to obstruct responses to ecological 
crises, this paper suggests that emergent challenges to human 
exceptionalism such as those provided by speculative realism are 
valuable to the development of earth justice systems predicated on rights 
for nature. It is also recognized that, at this stage in its development, the 
theory and practice of earth jurisprudence occupies both unruly and 
creative territory, one which requires scholars and practitioners to 
negotiate a heterogeneous terrain. 
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